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Although open source software has recently attracted a relevant
body of economic literature, a formal treatment of the process of com-
petition with its proprietary counterpart is still missing. Starting from
an epidemic model of innovation diﬀusion, we try to ﬁll this gap. We
propose a model where the two competing technologies depend on dif-
ferent factors, each one speciﬁc to its own mode of production (prof-
its and developers’ motivations respectively), together with network
eﬀects and switching costs. As the speed of diﬀusion of these tech-
nologies is crucial for the ﬁnal outcome, we endogenize the parame-
ter inﬂuencing it across the population of adopters. We ﬁnd that an
asymptotically stable equilibrium where both technologies coexist can
always be present and, when the propagation coeﬃcient is endogenous,
it coexists with winner–take–all solutions. Furthermore, an increase in
the level of the switching costs for one technology increases the num-
ber of its adopters, while reducing the number of the other one. If the
negative network eﬀects increase for one of the two technologies, then
the equilibrium level of users of that technology decrease.
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1 Introduction
The outstanding growth of adoption of Open Source Software (OSS) in
recent years has attracted the attention of many scholars in diﬀerent ﬁelds
of study. Indeed, a large number of case studies has been carried out to
explain and empirically ground such a relevant gain in popularity. Among
the others, topics such as the organisation and ethos of the community of
developers, together with their motivation to provide code for free and the
birth of hybrid business models have been extensively examined by diﬀerent
branches of social science literature.
An issue that has not been suﬃciently investigated so far and that needs
particular attention is the one pertaining to the OSS innovation model and
the way it competes against the Proprietary Software (PS) one. Some studies
have been put forward by the literature on the topic, but they lack a formal
treatment. To our knowledge, only few contributions have tried to overcome
such a shortfall (e.g. Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003; Dalle and Jullien, 2003),
although they rely on quite ad hoc models, rather than on the more de-
veloped models of innovation diﬀusion within the literature of innovation
economics.
Our starting point is thus to model the process of competition between
OSS and PS by means of an epidemic model able to take into account both
demand and supply side factors. We make the two technologies depend
on diﬀerent sets of determinants. In particular, OSS fundamentals depend
on reputational and communitarian factors (intrinsic and extrinsic motiva-
tions), while those of PS are essentially proﬁt motivated. At the same time,
both PS and OSS diﬀusion are inﬂuenced by the presence of network ef-
fects, the level of interoperability, and the presence of switching costs for
both software. Finally, compared to standard diﬀusion models, we consider
a model with an endogenous parameter inﬂuencing the speed of diﬀusion
across the population of adopters. In so doing, from a theoretical perspec-
tive, the model oﬀers a formal treatment to solve more complex and more
realistic diﬀusion models; from a more practical perspective, it gives a way
to properly deal with diﬀusion patterns whose speed can vary along the pro-
cess since the interactions among the technologies contribute to change the
incentives for consumers as they proceed in the discovery process of their
characteristics.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the theo-
retical background. In particular, available results in the area of both com-
petition between proprietary and open source software (Section 2.1) and
innovation diﬀusion models (Section 2.2) are put forward. On the grounds
of the previously mentioned results, we then discuss the general framework
within which the two competing technologies must be conceived, that is the
software industry. In particular, a set of three main features of software
technology are considered: network eﬀects, interoperability and switchingLeoncini R., Rentocchini F., Vittucci Marzetti G. 3
costs. These characteristics are at the core of the formal model introduced
in Section 3. The results are then presented in Section 4. In particular, sev-
eral variants of the model are discussed: (i) a base version characterised by
constant propagation coeﬃcients for the two technologies (Section 4.1); (ii)
an extended version incorporating changing propagation coeﬃcients with
(Section 4.2.2) and without network eﬀects (Section 4.2.1). Section 5 con-
cludes.
2 Theoretical background
2.1 The competition between proprietary and open source
software
The issue of OSS has gained momentum in recent years thanks to the echo
derived from a number of relevant “success stories”. Firefox among Internet
browsers, Apache among web servers, Linux in the operating system mar-
ket and OpenOﬃce among oﬃce suites are all well known examples. This
increasing popularity can be explained by several stylised facts (Leoncini,
2004). Indeed, OSS has questioned the traditional process of software de-
velopment as a proprietary one. As a matter of fact, recent years have
witnessed the continuous erosion of the user base of proprietary solutions
by OSS products. A discrete number of large ﬁrms have decided to enter
into the software market in order to challenge the incumbent monopolistic
position. To do so, they have heavily relied on the competitive advantage
constituted by OSS. Among the others, IBM, Novell and Dell are worth
mentioning. This fact has led to the creation of a new type of hybrid busi-
ness model characterised by the presence of for-proﬁt companies beneﬁting
from OSS solutions, which are mainly developed by not-for-proﬁt OSS com-
munities they support.1
Social science literature started to devote attention to the topic as well.2
In this section we focus the attention on the relationship between OSS
and PS devoting particular interest to the outcomes and implications of
the competition between the two software technologies. Although it is very
important to understand the mechanisms of competition and diﬀusion of the
1Furthermore, an increasing number of countries all over the world has started dis-
cussing about the role that OSS should have in Public Administration. Given the diﬀerent
nature of the public administration compared to private companies, many governments
have began to ask whether OSS should be a useful way to save on governmental budgets
and spurring local development.
2In particular, contributions in the ﬁeld can be organised into ﬁve general groups:
(i) the investigation of the nature of developers’ motivations; (ii) the problem of the
governance of OSS projects; (iii) the process of competition between OSS and PS; (iv)
the complex topic of IPRs’ inﬂuence on OSS and (v) government policies towards OSS.
A large part of the literature has mainly concentrated on the ﬁrst two areas of interest,
disregarding almost entirely the other topics. For a survey, see Rossi (2006).Leoncini R., Rentocchini F., Vittucci Marzetti G. 4
two competing technologies, this strand of literature is less developed than
the other ones and this is probably due to the diﬃculty in properly model
the process at stake.
The studies in the ﬁeld can be grouped in two main subsets. The most
part of the contributions rely on static models belonging to the industrial
organisation literature. In particular, stressing the importance that con-
sumers have in the production process of OSS (Lakhani and Von Hippel,
2003), Kuan (2001) models the competition between the two modes of pro-
duction assuming that agents must decide between buying software and
producing it. Johnson (2002) instead models the decision of individual user-
programmers to contribute to software program as a decision to contribute
to a public good. He shows that programmers participate only if the beneﬁt-
cost ratio is higher than a certain threshold and such threshold increases with
the probability of free-riding. Schmidt and Schnitzer (2003) identify three
main groups of adopters: (i) consumers already using OSS; (ii) consumers
already using proprietary software; (iii) users that choose between the two.
The authors show that increasing the number of OSS users by means of pub-
lic provided subsidies can lead to an increase of software price for locked-in
proprietary software users. Bitzer (2004) shows that product heterogeneity
is the main factor explaining the ability of incumbent ﬁrm (the one adopting
a proprietary mode of production) to be proﬁtable by setting a higher price
strategy than OSS entering ﬁrm. Bessen (2004) constructs a model in which
the choice of the form of provision of software is endogenous. Free riding is
a less pressing concern, provided that the base product is created in the ﬁrst
place. The main result is that the OSS form of software provision is more
eﬃcient because it is able to fulﬁll more complex and sophisticated needs of
consumers.
The second strand of literature is made up of works which try to anal-
yse the issue at stake in a dynamic framework. Their main contribution has
been to stress the role played by increasing returns on the demand side. Such
works have introduced network eﬀects (both direct and indirect), which are
likely to induce path-dependent processes (Arthur, 1989) and to produce
lock-in eﬀects (David, 1985). In particular, Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2003)
adopt a collective action model and run simulations on a speciﬁc explicit
OSS adoption function, thus showing that under some plausible assumptions
the two software production modes are likely to coexist. Dalle and Jullien
(2003) take into account network eﬀects as well, but they distinguish be-
tween local and global ones. The former refer to the proportion of a user’s
neighbours who have already adopted OSS, the latter to the proportion of
adopters in the whole population. They run simulations on the OSS adop-
tion function incorporating these factors, together with other more standard
ones, and ﬁnd that the pace of code improvement and proselytism are im-
portant factors in explaining OSS success and its coexistence with PS tech-
nology. Although the importance of these contributions, this literature stillLeoncini R., Rentocchini F., Vittucci Marzetti G. 5
lacks a tractable analytical treatment of the process, which is very useful if
some general results want to be achieved.
Although diﬀerent in the general framework (static models of industrial
organisation vs. non-linear dynamic models), all the models belonging to
the two principal subsets reach similar conclusions, that is PS and OSS are
likely to coexist in the long-run. However, none of these works has been
able to analyse properly the dynamics of the diﬀusion of the two competing
software technologies, which are based on diﬀerent industrial organisation
models.3 To this end, we now revert to models of competition among dif-
ferent techniques. In particular, given the peculiarities of the process we
analyse, we will refer to the literature on the diﬀusion of innovation, that
we review in the next Section.
2.2 The diﬀusion of innovation
The literature on the diﬀusion of innovation is vast and covers diﬀerent
strands, from orthodox to heterodox ones.4 The literature we refer to in
this paper is related to the epidemic models of diﬀusion, that, starting from
Mansﬁeld’s (1961) seminal contribution, have explored the characteristics
of the process of diﬀusion, explaining it in terms of the disequilibrium pro-
cess during which knowledge comes to be diﬀerentially distributed among
agents. In particular, we will follow the strand pioneered by Metcalfe (1981)
and Batten (1987), who introduced a supply side in the demand-led model
by Mansﬁeld (1961). In this way, the dynamic path follows a logistic pattern
determined by the joint dynamics of market demand and growth in produc-
tion capacity. Unlike the standard diﬀusion models, where the supply of
a new technique is perfectly elastic and allows supply to adjust smoothly
to growth in demand, these latter models show how the innovator’s reward
decreases during the diﬀusion process. Further developments brought in the
direction of broader models of diﬀusion (Metcalfe and Gibbons, 1987) have
been that of including more than one technique in order to show how the
process of diﬀusion might be the result of competition among techniques,
rather than the smooth diﬀusion of one only (Amable, 1992; Leoncini, 2001).
At the core of the epidemic approach there is the idea that the char-
acteristics of a technology are subject to a progressive path of discovery.
The features of the new technique are not well known and, as the avail-
able information spreads, the level of uncertainty associated with the new
3A notable exception is the recent contribution of Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat
(2006), who introduce a dynamic mixed duopoly model allowing competitors to have
heterogeneous objective functions and model the presence of demand-side learning. Unlike
the standard industrial organisation models, in this paper the dynamics of competition
between the two software technologies are properly taken into account.
4For a comprehensive survey on models of technology diﬀusion reporting a set of diﬀer-
ent models’ typologies see, for instance, Karshenas and Stoneman (1995); Geroski (2000).Leoncini R., Rentocchini F., Vittucci Marzetti G. 6
technique decreases, thus increasing the number of adopters.5 Such models
oﬀer a vision of the diﬀusion process whereby the innovator is rewarded for
his/her capacity of supplying a new technique for which the market lacks
full information. As the level of uncertainty decreases, expectations play a
role, especially if we refer to software markets, as they come to depend on
the personal information set an adopter is able to build based on previous
adopters’ experience, but also on the externalities he/she is able to gather
from the network of other users.
These characteristics are at the basis of our choice, as it is fairly evident
that software adoption follows a path of progressive discovery of its main
features, which is highly dependent on other adopters’ information sets. As
network externalities are heavily based on information exchange (contagion),
this kind of models appears to be the best suited one, although still impor-
tant modiﬁcations have to be made for a correct modelling of the problem.
Indeed, the analysis must be enriched with the characteristics peculiar to
the software mode of production and to the typology of competition process
in action. In particular, two major improvements are worth mentioning: (i)
the presence of network eﬀects on the demand side, which is a well known
phenomenon discussed in the literature on network industries (e.g. software
but also hardware, aircraft, etc.) (Shy, 2001); (ii) the possibility of adopting
contemporaneously competing products which is increasingly diﬀusing in re-
cent years, mainly in industries such as software where technical feasibility
of joint adoption has been spurred by increasing rate of standardisation of
technologies (Economides, 1996). Thus, the next Section presents a model
in line with the tradition of epidemic diﬀusion models which incorporates
all the above mentioned features.
3 General structure of the model
In this Section the general structure of the model is introduced. Before pre-
senting it, some important stylised facts dealing with the task of modelling
two competing software technologies on the grounds of epidemic diﬀusion
models should be addressed. In particular ﬁve main points will be taken
into consideration and properly discussed.
First of all, it should be stressed that a common feature characterizes
the diﬀusion of software technologies and the diﬀusion of a disease, namely
the fact that both are likely to take place by direct contact. Indeed, most
of the time either a new operating system or a new application is likely to
be adopted by a non-user if she is persuaded by a current user. Hence,
5Also in more orthodox models, with both one (Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993) and
multiple (Stoneman and Kwon, 1994) competing technologies, epidemic eﬀects have been
introduced to explain the process of endogenous learning as a process through which
information about a technology propagates as that technology spreads in the system.Leoncini R., Rentocchini F., Vittucci Marzetti G. 7
the diﬀusion of the technology can be thought as a disease that spreads all
over a population of non-users who, once infected, add up to the population
of current users. This factor points to the adoption of epidemic models to
model the process of interest as straightforward.6
Second, as pointed out in the previous section, epidemic models take
into account the supply side of the story by incorporating the production
capacity growth rate (Metcalfe, 1981). This is a reasonable step to be taken
if standard technologies are to be modelled, nevertheless our analysis con-
centrate on the software industry and here the relationship between demand
and production capacity is not as strict as in the previous case. Speciﬁc to
the production process characterising software, there is the possibility for
the producer to instantaneously supply a new unit of the product at neg-
ligible cost. This fact rules out the necessity for us to equate the rate of
growth of demand and supply and their level at every point in time. Of
course, taking into consideration the supply of software is important and we
do it by relating it directly to the speed by which the technology diﬀuses
among users, namely the coeﬃcient of propagation. Indeed, we assume that
the two diﬀerent modes of production characterising the two competing soft-
ware technologies impact directly on the probability that a user has to infect
current non-users.
Third, as several contributions in the ﬁeld have stressed the impor-
tance that network eﬀects on the demand side have in the software industry
(Katz and Shapiro, 1994; Liebowitz and Margolis, 1994), we model network
eﬀects by means of a parameter, ηi, which has a straightforward interpre-
tation in terms of the degree of interoperability between technology i and
technology j. In particular, we conceive ηi as the likelihood that a user of
technology j persuade user of technology i to dismiss technology i, that is the
degree of interoperability between technology i and technology j.7 Assuming
that the degree of interoperability between PS (x) and OSS (y) diminishes,
then we expect an increase in the likelihood that an OS user will persuade
a PS user to dismiss it. Thus, a negative relationship is envisaged between
the degree of interoperability of the two technologies (e.g. decrease in PS
interoperability) and a negative network eﬀect aﬀecting technology whose
degree of interoperability varies (e.g. increase in ηx). Moreover, the degree
of interoperability is asymmetric and it depends on the behaviour of soft-
6It must be underlined that we will not consider the possibility of diﬀerential morbidity
among the population of adopters. Indeed, it could be possible to consider that OSS
users behave diﬀerently from OSS developers. However, as the number of OSS adopters
increases, the share of “simple” users increases so that we can assume that OSS and PS
users tend to converge as the diﬀusion process unfolds.
7Although this is not the only kind of interpretation we can attach to parameter η, it is
surely the most useful and interesting we can think of for the ease of exposition. Another
interpretation can be referred, for example, to the number of available complementary
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ware producers.8 Indeed, the interoperability of OSS with PS — inversely
related to ηy — is linked to (i) the willingness of OSS developers to develop
interoperable software, and (ii) the degree of closure of PS standards.9 The
degree of interoperability of PS with OSS — inversely related to ηx — is
instead mainly due to the decision of PS’s producer not to implement OSS
standards.
Fourth, switching costs are another important factor peculiar to the soft-
ware industry that highly inﬂuence the process of competition between the
two software technologies. Switching costs generally arise when a buyer pur-
chases a particular product repeatedly and she ﬁnds it costly to switch from
one supplier to another. For this reason, in market with switching costs a
ﬁrm’s current market share is an important determinant of its future market
success (Klemperer, 1995). We introduce the concept of switching costs by
means of the parameter θi which should be interpreted as the probability
that being a previous user of technology j does not constitute in itself an ob-
stacle to the adoption of i. Thus, the parameter actually measure the extent
of switching costs between the two technologies which enter into the model
in two diﬀerent ways: (i) the higher θi, the higher the potential demand
for technology i given the higher costs users of technology i have to face to
switch to competing technology; (ii) the higher θi, the lower the negative
network eﬀect.10
Finally, the two technologies considered in our work are characterised by
two diﬀerent production processes. Proprietary software is produced by a
standard proﬁt-maximising ﬁrm, which faces high ﬁxed costs and negligible
8So, for instance, whereas the great majority of Linux distributions can read and write
FAT32 and NTFS ﬁle systems, which are Microsoft’s proprietary formats, Windows does
not recognise any Linux ﬁle system (e.g. ReiserFS or EXT3). In a similar manner,
OpenOﬃce can read and save ﬁles in Microsoft Oﬃce formats, whereas the latter does
not recognise OpenDocument formats.
9In case of closed standards, it might still be possible for OSS developers to implement
the standard by reverse engineering, but this requires more eﬀorts and usually does not
produce perfect results.
10Provided that our analysis is speciﬁc to the software industry, the general concept of
switching costs can be better reﬁned in terms of a set of factors peculiar to current de-
velopments in the software market. Among the others, the increasing possibility to joint
use diﬀerent software applications and operating systems on the same machine is likely to
inﬂuence the extent of the switching costs. Regarding PS users, their willingness to joint
adopt open source programs is inﬂuenced by a number of technical improvements that
became popular in recent years. Among the others, CD live distributions that allow users
to install and try OS operating systems without hurting the system already installed are
worth mentioning. Moreover, recent commitment of OSS towards user-friendly applica-
tions and the development of graphical interfaces similar to existing PS ones has increased
the eagerness to joint use PS and OSS once more. On the OSS side, joint adoption of
PS programs is fostered via a number of available freeware software which are oﬀered
coupled with costly applications or the operating system itself. Furthermore, the market-
ing strategies — mainly concentrating on the increasing friendliness and on the superior
performance and reliability of PS solutions compared to OSS ones — carried out by large
proprietary software vendors in recent years goes into this direction as well.Leoncini R., Rentocchini F., Vittucci Marzetti G. 9
marginal ones. On the contrary, open source software is produced thanks to
the co-ordination of a community of developers providing the source code
for free. Hence, the two supply structures are eminently diﬀerent. For PS
the most important factor inﬂuencing its rate of diﬀusion is the price of the
software while, for OSS, the eﬀort lavished by the community of developers
turns out to be extremely important.
In line with the previous discussion, we now turn to present the formal
structure of the model. First of all, we assume that the maximum number of
potential software users (D) is exogenously given. Each software technology
diﬀuses following a logistic pattern. In line with the epidemic approach,
every current user of each technology has a given probability to persuade
each current non-user to adopt it. The eﬀectiveness of the “word of mouth”
(βi > 0) can be diﬀerent for the competing technologies and is a function of
the features of the technology itself.
As for PS (x), we assume that it is a strictly decreasing and concave
function of its price (β′
x(p) < 0, β′′
x(p) ≥ 0). Moreover, given that software
industry is characterised by economies of scale, both static and dynamic
(Shy, 2001), we assume further: p′(x) < 0 and p′′(x) > 0. Hence, the speed
of diﬀusion of PS is a strictly increasing and concave function of its level of
adoption:
β′
x(x) > 0 (1)
β′′
x(x) < 0 (2)
As for OSS (y), given that its development does not entail any explicit
monetary cost, but it is simply the result of the eﬀorts made by the com-
munity of developers responding both to intrinsic and extrinsic motivations
(Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Bitzer et al., 2007), its ﬁnal users do not face any
direct explicit adoption cost, but only implicit ones. Relying on the fact
that, the higher the eﬀorts of the community, the more the OSS is “devel-
oped” and therefore the less the costs that ﬁnal users will suﬀer for using
it will be, we assume a negative relation between the total amount of such
eﬀorts and the level of these costs. The probability of OSS adoption (βy)
is thus modelled as a strictly increasing function of community’s eﬀorts (e):
β′
y(e) > 0, with decreasing marginal returns of eﬀorts, implying: β′′
y(e) ≤ 0.
Given that the sets of OSS ﬁnal users and developers are likely to over-
lap due to the importance in the OS method of production of user-driven
innovation (see Section 2.1 and Von Hippel and Von Krogh (2003)), we as-
sume that the level of eﬀorts is positively related to that of OSS adoption
(e′(y) > 0). Moreover, given that larger communities of developers are more
likely to face co-ordination problems, like either disagreement on the ac-
tual piece of code to be incorporated into the ﬁnal release, or disputes over
credit attribution, with a higher probability of “forking” (Lerner and Tirole,
2002), we assume further that the increase of eﬀorts in development is lessLeoncini R., Rentocchini F., Vittucci Marzetti G. 10
proportional than the increase of the level of adoption (e′′(y) < 0). Hence,
the speed of diﬀusion of OSS is a strictly increasing and concave function of
its level of adoption:
β′
y(y) > 0 (3)
β′′
y(y) < 0 (4)
The pattern of diﬀusion is aﬀected by negative network eﬀects, linked to
the relative level of adoption of the concurrent technologies. In particular,
we assume that each current user of a technology, given a speciﬁc degree
of the switching costs for the other technology, has a constant probability
to persuade each user of that technology to dismiss it. In our case, this
probability (ηx ≥ 0) is greater the greater is the lack of interoperability of
the PS technology x with OS technology y. Factors aﬀecting the extent of
network eﬀects in the diﬀusion process might be fruitfully reconnected to
the presence of non perfect interoperability between the two technologies.
Finally, as said above, we deﬁne a parameter (0 ≤ θi ≤ 1), which proxies
the switching costs that each current user of technology j must face to switch
to the competing technology i. Let θx (θy) be the probability that being
a previous user of PS (OS) does not constitute in itself an obstacle to the
adoption of the competing technology. Indeed, the higher θy, the higher the
number of agents that OS users can infect at time t because a lower number
of PS users refuse a priori to switch to OS. At the same time, the higher
θy, the lower the negative network eﬀect exerted by the market share of PS.
The dynamics of diﬀusion can be thus represented by the following au-
tonomous non-linear system of diﬀerential equations:
dx
dt
= βx(x) x (D − x − (1 − θx)y) − ηx(1 − θx) x y
dy
dt
= βy(y) y (D − (1 − θy)x − y) − ηy(1 − θy) x y (5)
4 Results
In this section we will present the main results of diﬀerent speciﬁcations
of the model. In particular, we will ﬁrstly analyse the model by keeping
the propagation coeﬃcient constant (Section 4.1). This ﬁrst speciﬁcation
is discussed in order to show that this particular version of the system re-
sembles the classical Lotka-Volterra one. In Section 4.2 we endogenize the
propagation coeﬃcients by making them depend on the price for PS and on
developers’ eﬀort for OSS respectively. Two cases are then discussed: (i) the
simple case with no network eﬀects (Section 4.2.1); (ii) the more complex
one with network eﬀects (Section 4.2.2).Leoncini R., Rentocchini F., Vittucci Marzetti G. 11
4.1 Diﬀusion patterns with a constant propagation coeﬃ-
cient
In this Section, we discuss the results of the model by assuming that the
actual level of technology diﬀusion does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the relevant
features of the technology, that is, the price for PS and the level of devel-
opment for OSS (p′(x) = e′(y) = 0); or, equivalently, that such features do
not alter the probability of adoption (β′
x(p) = β′
y(e) = 0)). Thus, we have





D − x − (1 +
ηx
βx






D − (1 +
ηy
βy
)(1 − θy) x − y
￿
(6)
Equations (6) are the well-known Lotka-Volterra equations for two com-
peting species (see, for instance, Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998, Ch.3). The
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βi for at least one technology. Figure 1 depicts the
possible cases with the out of equilibrium directions.
The suﬃcient and necessary condition for the stable coexistence of the








that is, the odds of switching to technology i should be greater than the
probability of dismissal for lack of interoperability with j divided by the
probability of adoption of i (Figure 1(a)).
If condition (9) does hold for only one technology, this technology dis-
places completely the other (Figures 1(c) and 1(d)). When instead condition
(9) does not hold for any technology, we are in the so called bistable case
(Figure 1(b)). There are two basins of attraction: the orbits in the ﬁrst one
11Let us note that this equilibrium is globally stable (or uniformly asymptotically stable
in the large). Thus, the initial conditions do not actually matter. For a proof of the
global stability of the equilibrium in the case of stable coexistence for the Lotka-Volterra
equations for two competing species by means of the Lyapunov function see, for instance,






˙ x = 0
˙ y = 0
(a) Asymptotically stable equilibrium
with technologies’ coexistence (high in-







˙ x = 0
˙ y = 0
(b) Saddle point (low interoperabil-





˙ x = 0
˙ y = 0
(c) Market tips in favour of OSS (low
interoperability of PS/high switching





˙ x = 0
˙ y = 0
(d) Market tips in favour of PS (low
interoperability of OS/high switching
costs for PS users)






˙ x = 0






(a) Decrease of the switching costs for






˙ x = 0






(b) Closure of PS standards (ηy in-
creases)
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converge to (D,0), whereas the others to (0,D), while E is a saddle point.
In such case the initial conditions matter.
Let us note that, in case of stable coexistence, a decrease of the switching
costs to technology i for previous users of technology j decreases (increases)
the total number of users of technology j (i), both exclusive and co-users;
whereas an increase of the interoperability of technology i actually makes
these users increase (decrease). In formal terms, if condition (9) is satis-
ﬁed and the probability of switching is not degenerate (θi < 1) for both





































So, for instance, if θy increases because of the decrease in the switching
costs for previous PS users, there is an absolute increase of OSS users (from
y∗ to y′∗ in Figure 2(a)) and a decrease of PS users (from x∗ to x′∗ in Figure
2(a)). On the contrary, if the degree of interoperability of OSS technology
decreases because of the closure of the standards adopted by PS, this makes
total OSS users decrease, whereas PS users instead increases (Figure 2(b)).
Thus, the closure of the standard by the PS producer is a very eﬀective strat-
egy in order to tip the market, causing a more than proportional decrease
in OSS market share.
When βi ≫ ηi, the number of users who will jointly use the two technolo-


















Let us ﬁnally note that the market shares in case of stable coexistence
are not aﬀected by the absolute size of the market.12
4.2 Diﬀusion patterns with a changing propagation coeﬃ-
cient
In this Section we modify the previous model by assuming that the two
diﬀerent supply structures inﬂuence the propagation coeﬃcient and, through
it, the patterns of diﬀusion. In particular, Section 4.2.1 assumes the absence




βx (ηy(1 − θy) − βyθy)
βy (ηx(1 − θx) − βxθx)
.
and it does not depend on the total amount of demand (D).Leoncini R., Rentocchini F., Vittucci Marzetti G. 14
of network eﬀects whereas Section 4.2.2 takes into account the most complex
issue of the diﬀusion of two competing software technologies with network
eﬀects and switching costs.
4.2.1 Absence of network eﬀects
To begin with, we analyse the case of perfect interoperability, where no




= βx(x) x (D − x − (1 − θx)y)
dy
dt
= βy(y) y (D − (1 − θy)x − y) (10)
Although βi is now a function of the actual level of diﬀusion of the
correspondent technology, the equilibrium values depend only on the extent
of switching costs (θi) and are equal to:
x∗ =
θxD
θx + θy − θxθy
y∗ =
θyD
θx + θy − θxθy
(11)
Provided that these parameters are not degenerate, such equilibrium
is asymptotically stable, no matter what the actual form of the functions
βi(i) is (see Appendix A.1 for a proof of the asymptotic stability of the
equilibrium). In such case, the situation is still the one depicted in Figure
1(a), although now there is perfect interoperability. Thus, in the present
case the outcome is always the stable coexistence.
It is worth stressing that the market shares of the competing technolo-
gies are not aﬀected by those features that interact with the propagation
coeﬃcient – the price for PS and level of development for OSS –, but only
by the ones which instead aﬀect the switching costs. Thus, by assuming per-
fect interoperability and the presence of switching costs, the ﬁnal outcome
is neither the most eﬃcient one nor the one in which the product with the
best features (eﬀective or potential) is actually chosen (Arthur, 1989). In
the stable equilibrium all the users adopt at least one technology, whereas
the number of users who jointly adopt the two is equal to θxy (= θyx).
4.2.2 Presence of network eﬀects
In order to analyse the dynamics in the most complex case, we work out the












(D − y) (13)
Let us note ﬁrst that the convex hull of {(0,0),(D,0),(D,D),(0,D)} is
the only relevant area, given that the threshold D is a physical constraint
(i.e. the actual number of users of each technology cannot be greater than
the maximum feasible number of users). Hence, we have to take into account
only the interval [0,D] for each variable.































If conditions (1) and (2) hold and θx is not degenerate, we have d2y∗/dx2 <













and limx→D y∗(x) = 0, by the strict concavity of y∗(x) follows that:


















x )(1 − θx)
x (16)
where βM
x = βx(D). This line is the isocline of x in the model with a
constant propagation coeﬃcient, calculated at the maximum attainable PS
propagation coeﬃcient (Equation (7)).
















˙ x = 0





˙ y = 0
(b) Isocline of y
Figure 3: Isoclines
and there is therefore a unique local maximum of the function (y∗
M ∈
[0, D
1−θx]) lying in the domain (0,D).13 Hence, the function is as in Fig-
ure 3(a) and x will increase (decrease) depending on the combination (x,y)
being actually below (above) the function.
What remains to be analysed are the eﬀects of the two parameters (θx
and ηx) on the shape of the function. As for θx, it is suﬃcient to note that it
enters the function simply as a multiplicative constant. Hence, an increase
of θx moves x’s isocline upward as in Figure 4(a), whereas a decrease of it
moves the curve the other way around. As for ηx, an increase of it makes
the curve change as in Figure 4(b) (see Appendix B for a more in depth
analysis of the eﬀects of the parameters on y∗(x)).
In the light of the analogy of assumptions (1)-(2) and (3)-(4), Equations
(12) and (13) are symmetric with respect to the axes and the isocline of y
is the one shown in Figure 3(b). All the analysis carried out for the isocline
of x is therefore valid also for the other isocline provided that the notation
for x is substituted with the notation for y.
The solutions for the most complex case are depicted in Figure 5. Again,
depending on the shape of the isoclines, we can have one stable solution with
coexistence of both technologies (point E in Figure 5(a)).14 However, E is
not a globally stable equilibrium, as points outside the hearth–shaped area
tend towards equilibria characterised by winner–take–all solutions (points














































and we are back in the case analysed in Section 4.2.1.





˙ x = 0





˙ x = 0
(b) Increase of ηx
Figure 4: Changes of the parameters
D). This is even more the case if the isoclines move, making the area of
stable trajectories to shrink, until the equilibrium point E becomes a saddle
point, which shows one winning technology and dependence from initial
conditions (Figure 5(b)).
Once comparative dynamics are taken into consideration, some interest-
ing issues emerge (Figure 6). First of all, a closure of the PS standard is
likely to induce a strong negative eﬀect on the OS technology which can even
tip the market in favour of PS (Figure 6(a)). This highlights the fact that
PS producer has an important strategic instrument to reduce the degree of
interoperability of OSS and lock-in the market towards proprietary technol-
ogy. Second, a decrease in the level of switching costs for PS users produces
an increase in the overall number of users adopting OSS (Figure 6(b)). This
increase can be a consequence of the diﬀusion of OSS live distributions, as
well as to the commitment of OSS towards user-friendly applications and
the development of graphical interfaces similar to existing PS ones.
It should also be noted that, as far as the OS technology is concerned,
the community ethos, i.e. the strong sense of belonging to the community of
developers, has instead a strong negative eﬀect on θx, because it decreases
considerably the probability of OS users to adopt the PS technology. In this
sense, the diﬀusion of the Free Software movement and the creation of Free
Software Foundation (1984), along with the strong charisma of his founder,
Richard Stallman, has been a great tool of diﬀusion.
Finally, it might happen that, with a low level of interoperability for both
technologies, no diﬀusion actually takes place (Figure 6(c)). Nevertheless,
in this case the more likely outcome is that the technology characterised by
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(c) Strong lack of interoperability
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5 Conclusions
This paper has shown how to implement a formal model of innovation dif-
fusion in order to model two competing technologies in high-tech industries.
Indeed, as they are characterised by the presence of economies of scale, net-
work eﬀects and switching costs, a proper theoretical modeling is needed,
that, to our knowledge, has not been carried out so far. Moreover, if open
source is taken into consideration, other issues surface, such as the eﬀort of
the community, developers’ motivations and the degree of interoperability.
All these topics have been incorporated in a modiﬁed version of a stan-
dard epidemic model, which innovate the existing literature in many re-
spects. Above all, the endogenization of the propagation coeﬃcient adds
complexity to the general structure of the model, yielding interesting re-
sults, such as, an asymptotically stable equilibrium where both technologies
coexist can be present across all of the diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the model.
This result is obtained in a dynamic setting, thus enriching the achievements
of the literature on OSS-PS competition, which obtained it only in a static
context. Moreover, our model adds up new insights to the literature on
the diﬀusion of competing technologies under increasing returns where the
standard result is that the market tips in favour of one of the two. Finally,
network eﬀects and switching costs turn out to be important factors that
the supplier of one technology can change in order to modify the equilibrium
point and, in this way, the market share relative to the opponent one.
Within this innovative theoretical framework, the main results are the
following. First of all, in all the diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the model there is
always the possibility to obtain an asymptotically stable equilibrium where
both technologies coexist. Thus, contrary to the result obtained by Amable
(1992), the process of competition between two technologies characterised by
increasing returns do not necessarily ends up with one of the two tipping the
market, at least in the present case, where the possibility of joint adoption
is taken into account.
Second, we have been able to present the conditions that determine the
success of one technology with respect to another one: (i) under the as-




βi), the odds of switching to competing technology must be greater
than the ratio of the probability of dismissal for lack of interoperability and
the (constant) probability of adoption; (ii) when the coeﬃcient of propaga-
tion is let to vary, then the condition can be computed formally only if a
functional form for the propagation coeﬃcient is assumed.
Third, in the case of coexistence of both technologies, it is possible to
modify the equilibrium by changing the values of parameters θ and η. In
particular, a decrease of the switching costs for PS users (an increase of θy)
yields a more than proportional increase in the number of OSS users and a
contemporary decrease in the absolute number of PS users. If the negativeLeoncini R., Rentocchini F., Vittucci Marzetti G. 20
network eﬀect increases (an increase of ηy), then the number of OSS users
decreases and PS users increase.15
Finally, the stability of the equilibrium point is a recursive result through
the diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the model. However, while under the assump-
tion of exogenous probability of adoption, the equilibrium point is globally
stable, when the propagation coeﬃcient is endogenous the equilibrium point
is only locally stable and it coexists with two other points around which one
of the two technologies is likely to tip the market. In this last case, a change
in the parameters θ and η leads to a modiﬁcation of the basin of attraction
of the equilibrium point.
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Appendix
A Proof of the asymptotic stability of the equilib-
rium
A.1 Perfect interoperability
In order to prove the stability of the equilibrium in the case of perfect
interoperability analysed in Section 4.2.1, let us work out the Jacobian of
the system at the equilibrium:
J =
￿
−βx(x∗)x∗ −(1 − θx)βx(x∗)x∗
−(1 − θy)βy(y∗)y∗ −βy(y∗)y∗
￿











yy∗)2 + 4(1 − θy)(1 − θx)β∗
xx∗β∗
yy∗ > 0
The determinant of J is positive whereas its trace is negative, therefore
both the eigenvalues are real and negative and (x∗,y∗) is a stable node.
A.2 Non perfect interoperability
In the more general case of non perfect interoperability (Section 4.2.2), the
Jacobian calculated at the ﬁxed points is:
J =
￿
−βx(x∗)x∗ −(ηx + βx(x∗))(1 − θx)x∗
−(ηy + βy(y∗))(1 − θy)y∗ −βy(y∗)y∗
￿







yy∗ − (ηx + β∗
x)(ηy + β∗




yy∗)2 + 4(ηx + β∗
x)(ηy + β∗
y)(1 − θy)(1 − θx)x∗y∗(> 0)
This discriminant is always positive, whereas the trace of the Jacobian is
negative. Thus, the ﬁxed points can be either saddle points or stable nodes
depending on the determinant of the Jacobian being positive or negative.
This determinant is equal to:
|J| = β∗
xx∗β∗
yy∗ − (ηx + β∗
x)(ηy + β∗
y)(1 − θy)(1 − θx)x∗y∗
and it is positive if and only if:













































Recalling the symmetry between Equation (12) and (13), we have:
−
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and the point E is therefore a stable node.
B Eﬀects of parameter changes on the isocline
As for θx, by the envelope theorem, the marginal eﬀect of an increase of it
on the maximum of y∗(x) (y∗









This marginal eﬀect is therefore directly proportional to the initial level
















Also this eﬀect is directly proportional to the initial level of the maximum





Moreover, a change of ηx makes also the value of x corresponding to y∗
M
change. In particular, an increase of ηx makes y∗−1(y∗







Indeed, from Equation (14) it follows that the FOC are satisﬁed if the ex-
pression in brackets is equal to zero. Working out the total diﬀerential ofLeoncini R., Rentocchini F., Vittucci Marzetti G. 25








x(x)ηx(D − x) − 2β′
x(x)(ηx + βx(x))
.
The denominator of such expression is negative. Therefore it is negative if
and only if condition (18) holds. 
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